The Static Credential Problem
Every few weeks, another breach makes headlines: "Attackers accessed production database using exposed credentials." "SSH key leaked in public GitHub repository." "API key hardcoded in application source." The common thread? Static credentials—long-lived secrets that never expire and can be used from anywhere.
According to GitGuardian's 2024 State of Secrets Sprawl report, over 12.8 million secrets were exposed in public GitHub repositories in 2023 alone. Verizon's Data Breach Investigations Report found that 81% of hacking-related breaches leveraged stolen or weak credentials. These aren't sophisticated zero-day exploits—they're attackers using perfectly valid credentials that shouldn't exist in the first place.
The Four Problems with Static Credentials
- They Never Expire
A leaked SSH key from 2019 still works today unless manually revoked
- They Can Be Copied Infinitely
Once stolen, credentials can be used from any location, device, or time
- They Lack Context
No audit trail showing who, when, why, or from where access occurred
- They're Impossible to Rotate
Changing shared database passwords requires coordinating dozens of systems
Types of Static Credentials (And Why Each Is Dangerous)
1. Passwords: The Original Sin
Passwords are the most common static credential. They're shared between systems, written on sticky notes, stored in password managers, and frequently reused across accounts. Even with hashing and salting, password databases are high-value targets.
The risk: Password spray attacks, credential stuffing, phishing, and database breaches all target passwords. Once compromised, attackers can access any system accepting that password—often multiple systems if users reuse credentials.
# Typical password-based database access
# Password stored in .env file, shared across team
export DB_HOST=prod-postgres.internal
export DB_USER=app_service
export DB_PASSWORD=P@ssw0rd123! # ⚠️ Static, never expires
psql "postgresql://$DB_USER:$DB_PASSWORD@$DB_HOST/production"
# Problems:
# - Password in plaintext on disk
# - Same password used by 12 different services
# - No idea who's actually connecting
# - Can't revoke access for single user
# - Password hasn't been rotated in 2 years2. SSH Keys: Persistent Backdoors
SSH keys were designed to be more secure than passwords. Instead of a shared secret, you have a public/private key pair. In practice, they're worse: SSH keys never expire, are rarely rotated, and once an attacker has your private key, they have permanent access.
The risk: A developer's laptop gets compromised, stolen, or lost. The SSH private key on that laptop grants access to hundreds of production servers indefinitely. Most organizations have dozens of orphaned SSH keys from former employees still authorized on production systems.
# Traditional SSH key access
ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa_production user@prod-server-01
# This key:
# - Created in 2018, never expires
# - Copied to 3 different laptops
# - Backed up to Dropbox (unencrypted)
# - Owner left company in 2022
# - Still works today
# To revoke: manually edit authorized_keys on 47 servers
# Reality: never gets done, key persists forever3. API Keys and Tokens: Infinite Lifetime, Unlimited Power
Cloud provider API keys, service account tokens, and application API keys often have unlimited lifetimes and broad permissions. They're embedded in CI/CD pipelines, stored in environment variables, and committed to private repositories that eventually become public.
The risk: A single leaked AWS API key can cost hundreds of thousands in cryptomining charges within hours. GitHub personal access tokens with repo access can exfiltrate entire codebases. These credentials often have more permissions than any individual user should have.
# AWS credentials hardcoded in CI/CD
# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
env:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE # ⚠️ Static
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
# This key has:
# - AdministratorAccess policy (full AWS account control)
# - No expiration date
# - No IP restrictions
# - No MFA requirement
# - Visible to anyone with repo access
# - Logged in CloudTrail but impossible to attribute to individual
# One leaked key = entire AWS account compromised4. Database Credentials: The Crown Jewels
Database credentials are often the most sensitive static secrets. They're shared across applications, stored in configuration files, and rarely rotated because changing them requires updating dozens of services.
The risk: A single database user account with broad permissions can access customer data, financial records, and PII. When breaches occur, investigators find database credentials hardcoded in application code, stored in plaintext configuration files, or written in runbooks.
Real-World Breach Examples
Actual Breaches Caused by Static Credentials
Attackers found AWS credentials hardcoded in a private GitHub repository. Used those credentials to access S3 bucket containing 57 million user records. Cost: $148 million in settlements.
Malware on engineer's laptop stole session token. Attackers used token to access customer secrets stored in CI/CD environment variables, including OAuth tokens and cloud credentials affecting thousands of organizations.
Access key to data server accidentally made public on GitHub. Exposed location data for 2+ million vehicles over 10 years. Key had been active since 2013.
Engineer's home computer compromised, keylogger captured master password. Attackers accessed corporate vault containing production database credentials and encryption keys. Led to breach affecting millions of password vault customers.
Attackers modified Bash Uploader script to exfiltrate credentials from CI/CD environments. Captured thousands of customer secrets including AWS keys, GCP service accounts, and GitHub tokens over 2 months before detection.
Notice the pattern: in every case, the stolen credentials were static, long-lived, and worked perfectly for the attackers because there was no expiration, no device binding, and often no audit trail showing the compromise.
Certificate-Based Authentication: The Solution
The alternative to static credentials is certificate-based authentication with short-lived certificates. Instead of storing a secret, users and systems prove their identity to a certificate authority (CA), which issues a cryptographically signed certificate valid for hours, not years.
Why Certificates Are Better Than Static Credentials
- Automatic Expiration
Certificates expire in hours, not years. Stolen certificates become useless automatically.
- Identity Context
Certificates embed user identity, device ID, IP restrictions, and permissions.
- Instant Revocation
Compromised certificate? Revoke immediately without updating config files across systems.
- Complete Audit Trail
Know exactly who accessed what, when, from where, and why—with cryptographic proof.
- Device Binding
Certificate private keys stored in hardware TPM/Secure Enclave, can't be copied.
How Certificate-Based Access Works
Here's the authentication flow with certificate-based access:
# Step 1: User authenticates with SSO (MFA required)
tac login
# → Opens browser, authenticates via Okta/Google/Azure AD
# → MFA challenge (push notification, WebAuthn)
# → Device trust verified (OS version, disk encryption, EDR running)
# Step 2: Request access to specific resource
tac ssh alice@prod-db-server \
--reason="Investigating slow query from INC-8472"
# TigerAccess Auth Service:
# 1. Verifies user identity from SSO token
# 2. Checks RBAC: Does alice have ssh_login role for prod-db-server?
# 3. Checks access request workflow: Is approval required?
# 4. Generates X.509 certificate with:
# - Subject: alice@company.com
# - Valid: 2024-12-13 10:00:00 to 2024-12-13 14:00:00 (4 hours)
# - Principals: alice, db-admin
# - Extensions: device_id=TPM-ABC123, ip=203.0.113.42
# - Purpose: ssh-login to prod-db-server
# 5. Signs certificate with CA private key
# 6. Returns certificate to client
# Step 3: Client uses certificate for authentication
# Certificate stored in memory, never written to disk
# SSH connection established with certificate auth
# Server verifies certificate signature against CA public key
# Step 4: Certificate auto-expires after 4 hours
# No cleanup needed, no revocation required
# Next access requires fresh authenticationEliminating Static Credentials Across Infrastructure
SSH Access: Certificate-Based Authentication
# Before: Static SSH key (never expires)
ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa_prod user@server
# After: Certificate-based (expires in 4 hours)
tac ssh user@server --reason="Deploy hotfix"
# What changed:
# - No SSH key file on disk
# - Fresh authentication via SSO + MFA
# - Certificate includes user identity
# - Audit log shows: who, when, why, from where
# - Session automatically recorded
# - Certificate expires after 4 hoursDatabase Access: Dynamic Credentials
# Before: Static database password
export DB_PASSWORD="hardcoded_password_123"
psql "postgresql://app:$DB_PASSWORD@prod-db/main"
# After: TigerAccess generates ephemeral credentials
tac db connect postgres-prod --reason="Query customer analytics"
# Behind the scenes:
# 1. User authenticates via SSO
# 2. TigerAccess checks RBAC permissions
# 3. Creates temporary database user: alice_20241213_1430
# 4. Grants minimal required permissions
# 5. Issues certificate with DB credentials
# 6. Opens proxied connection
# 7. Deletes database user after session ends (max 4 hours)
# Benefits:
# - No shared passwords
# - Each user gets unique credentials
# - Automatic cleanup
# - Complete query audit trailCloud API Access: Federated Identities
# Before: Long-lived AWS access key
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/...
aws s3 ls
# After: Temporary credentials via OIDC federation
tac cloud aws --account=production --reason="Deploy infrastructure"
# TigerAccess flow:
# 1. User authenticates, gets certificate
# 2. Certificate includes AWS role ARN
# 3. TigerAccess calls AWS STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
# 4. Returns temporary credentials (valid 1 hour)
# 5. Credentials auto-injected into environment
# 6. All AWS API calls logged with user attribution
# Result:
# - No static AWS keys
# - Credentials expire in 1 hour
# - CloudTrail shows actual user (alice@company.com), not service account
# - Can revoke access instantly by invalidating certificateKubernetes Access: Short-Lived Kubeconfigs
# Before: Long-lived kubeconfig with static token
kubectl get pods --kubeconfig=~/.kube/admin-config
# After: Certificate-based kubeconfig
tac kube login production-cluster
# Generated kubeconfig contains:
# - X.509 client certificate (valid 8 hours)
# - Kubernetes groups from RBAC roles
# - Namespace restrictions from access policy
apiVersion: v1
kind: Config
users:
- name: alice@company.com
user:
client-certificate-data: <certificate expires 2024-12-13 18:00>
client-key-data: <private key>
# Every kubectl command:
# - Authenticated via certificate
# - Authorized against K8s RBAC
# - Logged in audit trail
# - Certificate expires automaticallyHow TigerAccess Eliminates Static Credentials
TigerAccess is built from the ground up to eliminate static credentials across your entire infrastructure:
TigerAccess Zero Static Credentials Architecture
Internal CA issues short-lived certificates (1-12 hours) for users, services, and AI agents. Separate CAs for SSH, database, Kubernetes, and web access ensure credential isolation.
Authenticate via Okta, Azure AD, Google Workspace, or any OIDC/SAML provider. MFA required for all access. No local passwords or keys.
For databases, TigerAccess creates temporary users with minimal permissions, rotates credentials automatically, and deletes users after session expiry.
Protocol proxies for SSH, RDP, databases (15+ protocols), Kubernetes, and web apps handle authentication, authorization, and session recording transparently.
Services, CI/CD pipelines, and AI agents get identity certificates with embedded permissions and safety controls. No API keys in environment variables.
Request elevated access when needed, approval workflows via Slack/PagerDuty, automatic expiration after defined period. Zero standing privileges.
Migration Guide: From Static to Dynamic Credentials
Migrating from static credentials to certificate-based access doesn't have to be disruptive. Here's a proven 90-day migration plan:
90-Day Migration Roadmap
Phase 1: Discovery and Planning (Days 1-14)
- •Audit static credentials: Use tools like truffleHog, git-secrets to find hardcoded secrets in repositories
- •Inventory infrastructure: List all servers, databases, Kubernetes clusters requiring access
- •Map access patterns: Who accesses what, how often, with what tools
- •Prioritize by risk: Crown jewel systems (production databases, payment processing) migrate first
- •Deploy TigerAccess: Install in audit-only mode, doesn't block existing access
Phase 2: SSH Migration (Days 15-35)
- •Configure SSH CA: Trust TigerAccess SSH CA on all servers via
TrustedUserCAKeys - •Pilot team: 5-10 engineers migrate to
tac sshinstead of direct SSH - •Enable session recording: Record all SSH sessions for compliance
- •Gather feedback: Iterate on user experience, fix friction points
- •Rollout to all engineers: Company-wide SSH migration, deprecate SSH keys
- •Remove authorized_keys: Delete static SSH keys from all servers
Phase 3: Database Migration (Days 36-60)
- •Configure database proxies: Set up TigerAccess database proxies for PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB
- •Start with dev/staging: Migrate non-production databases first
- •Application migration: Update apps to use TigerAccess-issued database credentials
- •Production cutover: Migrate production databases, retire shared credentials
- •Enable query logging: Audit all database queries with user attribution
Phase 4: Cloud and Kubernetes (Days 61-80)
- •OIDC federation: Configure AWS/GCP/Azure to trust TigerAccess as OIDC provider
- •Replace access keys: Delete long-lived AWS keys, use temporary credentials
- •Kubernetes integration: Trust TigerAccess certificates for kubectl access
- •Service mesh: Integrate with Istio/Linkerd for workload identity
Phase 5: CI/CD and Machine Identity (Days 81-90)
- •GitHub Actions: Use TigerAccess OIDC for deployment credentials
- •Service accounts: Migrate services to machine identity certificates
- •Secrets elimination: Remove all secrets from CI/CD environment variables
- •Final audit: Verify zero static credentials remain in production
Measuring Success: Zero Static Credential Metrics
Track these metrics to verify you've eliminated static credentials:
# Key metrics for static credential elimination
1. Static Credential Count: 0
- No SSH keys in authorized_keys files
- No hardcoded passwords in config files
- No long-lived API keys in CI/CD
- No shared database accounts
2. Certificate Lifetime: < 12 hours
- Human certificates: 4-8 hours average
- Machine certificates: 1 hour for AI agents, 24 hours for services
- Database credentials: Session-bound, max 4 hours
3. Access Audit Coverage: 100%
- Every infrastructure connection logged
- Full context: who, what, when, where, why
- Cryptographic proof via certificate serial numbers
4. Mean Time to Revoke: < 5 minutes
- Certificate revocation propagates instantly
- No need to update config files or rotate keys
- Compromised identity = immediate access termination
5. Standing Privilege Percentage: 0%
- All elevated access via just-in-time requests
- Automatic expiration after approval period
- No permanent admin accountsCommon Migration Challenges (And Solutions)
Challenge: "We have legacy systems that only support password auth"
Solution: TigerAccess can generate ephemeral passwords for legacy systems, rotating them automatically. The password is never shown to the user—authentication happens transparently via the proxy.
Challenge: "Engineers complain about re-authenticating every few hours"
Solution: Use longer certificate lifetimes for trusted devices (8-12 hours) and enable certificate renewal without re-authentication. Balance convenience with security based on risk.
Challenge: "We have automated scripts that need unattended access"
Solution: Use machine identity with renewable certificates. Service accounts get certificates that auto-renew before expiry, no human intervention needed. Much safer than permanent API keys.
Challenge: "Our compliance team requires access records for 7 years"
Solution: TigerAccess stores complete audit logs in ClickHouse with automatic retention policies. Session recordings archived to S3 with immutable storage for regulatory compliance.
The Security Benefits of Zero Static Credentials
Organizations that eliminate static credentials see immediate security improvements:
- 93% reduction in credential-based breaches: Stolen certificates expire automatically, limiting blast radius to hours instead of months
- Complete audit trail: Every access logged with full context, enabling rapid incident response and forensic investigations
- Instant access revocation: Compromised accounts can be locked out in seconds, not days waiting for key rotation
- Compliance automation: SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI DSS requirements for access control met automatically with certificate-based access
- Reduced attack surface: No credentials to steal from GitHub repos, environment variables, or developer laptops
Conclusion: The Future is Certificate-Based
Static credentials are a relic of a simpler era—when infrastructure lived in data centers, employees worked from offices, and attackers couldn't exfiltrate millions of records in hours. That world is gone.
Modern infrastructure demands modern authentication: short-lived certificates that prove identity cryptographically, expire automatically, and provide complete audit context. Certificate-based access isn't just more secure—it's more usable, more auditable, and eliminates the operational burden of credential rotation.
The question isn't whether to eliminate static credentials, but how quickly you can migrate before the next credential leak becomes your next breach headline.